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ABSTRACT
Traditionally defined as the union of  one man and one woman charged 
with the responsibility of  rearing children, the notion of  family now includes 
a variety of  living arrangements including non-marital cohabitation and single 
parents. The current study investigates individual incentives to change family 
structure from a person’s original status as single. This conceptual research, 
which is grounded in theories of  marriage, proposes that federal, personal 
income tax is an input to change in family structure. A model of  family 
structure change and propositions of  the relationship between the federal tax 
and family structure are developed.
Family Structure Choice: Taxation as an Incentive to Change
The notion of  family has taken on various meanings in the United States 
(US) over the last decade. Traditionally defined as the union of  one man and 
one woman charged with the responsibility of  rearing children, the notion 
of  family now includes various living arrangements such as non-marital 
cohabitation and single parents.  With the traditional marriage rate decreasing 
(Bumpass, Sweet, and Cherlin 1991), the divorce rate increasing (Thornton 
1985), and the growth rate of  non-martial cohabitation exploding (Clarkberg, 
Stolzenberg, and Waite 1995), the social concept of  family continues to 
change. These dramatic changes impact everyday life (e.g., social norms 
and employment) and the rights (e.g., taxation, health care coverage, and 
inheritance) of  thousands US citizens. Furthermore, the concept of  family 
(i.e., marital status drives tax rates) is the basis of  individual federal taxation 
in the US. With 85% of  United States’ tax revenues generated from individual 
income taxes (Council of  Economic Advisers 2007), how the notion of  family 
is perceived and codified by law has pervasive effects for both individuals and 
the United States’ economy. The current study explores the concept of  family 
and how the legal constraints and the tax benefit/cost of  “marital status” is 
exhibited in family structure. Specifically, the current study seeks to develop 
a conceptual framework for addressing two questions. First, what influences 
individuals to change their family status? Second, how do legal constraints 
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and federal tax incentives (disincentives) influence choice of  family structure? 
In investigating these questions, the current study makes several important 
contributions. First, the current study offers a conceptual framework of  
family structure change. Second, this study synthesizes existing literature and 
identifies factors that influence a person’s choice to change his or her family 
structure.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION AND RELEVANT LITERATURE
The concept of  family is a topic of  investigation in various areas of  study 
including family studies (e.g., Roy 2008, Soto 2006), sociology (e.g., Clarkberg 
1999), law (e.g., Bowman 2004), business (e.g., Lee and Beatty 2002), population 
studies (e.g., Emisch 2008; ), and economics (Winkler 1997). Although a meta-
analysis of  the literature is not in the scope of  the current study, a broad 
review of  the research provides insight into the fundamental theories of  family 
and the conceptualization of  family across disciplines.
Theories of  Family 
 The most prevalence theory of  family is an economic explanation 
of  marriage.  Economists hold that individuals form unions when doing so 
makes both partners better off  (Becker, 1965, 1973). The economic gain of  
the joint arrangement is derived from the notion of  specialization. Becker’s 
seminal work, for which he was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1992, focused on 
the family as production units that produce both goods in the home and in the 
marketplace. By having one person specialize in domestic responsibilities while 
the other provided financial support, couples are more efficient than singles 
(Stevenson 2008). Furthermore, Becker (1965) predicts that opposites will 
attract to maximize the benefit of  specialization. Lam (1998) found empirical 
support for the notion of  “opposites will attract.” 
Similar to the Becker’s economic theory is Marx’s epistemology, which 
suggests families are social arrangements to formalize primal relationship 
and attend elementary needs of  reproduction and survival. Two types of  
relationships emerge among humans: 1) those originated in elementary 
survival needs (i.e., mating and conjugal bonds, paternity and offspring care, 
transferring to patrimonial knowledge for survival), and 2) those originated for 
social relationships, which provide the foundation of  culture (Soto 2006).
Cohen’s  (1987, 2002) life-profile theory argues that the woman 
traditionally invests in child bearing, child rearing,  and homemaking early in 
a marriage with the expectation of  reaping the benefits in the long-run. The 
man, who is relatively free of  domestic responsibilities, can dedicate his efforts 
to climbing the latter to economic security.  The life-profile theory suggests 
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that marriage may be a mechanism for protecting the woman’s early marriage-
specific investments over time in the face of  possible later mistreatment by her 
partner (Dnes 2007).
The “opportunity-cost” hypothesis suggests that childbearing itself  is 
negatively related to perceived employment opportunities (Ward and Butz 
1980; Hogan and Kitagawa 1985). According to Olsen and Farkas (1990), 
when both partners (i.e., husband and wife) have economic opportunities, it is 
expected that the marriage rate will increase because of  the male employment 
effect, and that childbearing rates will decrease because of  the female 
opportunity-cost effect. Together, these effects should decrease out-of-wedlock 
childbearing.
Brien, Lillard, and Stern’s (2006) model of  marriage, cohabitation, 
and divorce is based on the match quality economic theory. According to 
this theory, single individuals not currently in a co-residential relationship 
randomly meet one potential partner, who has an associated match quality 
that is not immediately observed by the individual.  “Rather, an individual 
receives a noisy signal of  the true quality” (Brien, Lillard, and Stern 1006, p. 
457). The decision to enter into a relationship is made without the realization 
of  the true match quality. This uncertainty is eliminated with relationship 
experience. Individuals evaluate the match quality and may choose to continue 
in the relationship (i.e., stay married or continue cohabiting) or change the 
relationship (i.e., covert cohabiting into marriage, dissolve the relationship, or 
divorce).
In summary, theories of  marriage are grounded in the fundamental 
notion of  give and take. Individuals engage in social arrangements with the 
expectation of  maximizing their return on their investment. Although many 
exogenous factors influence the decision of  if  or when to engage in marriage, 
the basic foundation of  marriage is grounded in a mutually consensual social 
union that benefits both parties. These unions are the basis for the structure of  
family.
Cohabitation
A less studied topic is the notion of  cohabitation. More often associated 
with lower socioeconomic status (Ressler and Waters 1995) and same-sex 
couples (e.g., Rostosky, Riggle, Brodnicki, and Olson 2008), cohabitation as 
a type of  family has received limited consideration in the literature. Rather, 
studies of  cohabitation focus on outcomes of  such arrangements, including the 
cause of  decline in the traditional family (Axinn and Thornton 1992; Bumpass, 
Sweet, and Cherlin 1991) and economic decision-making (Cherlin and Fomby 
2004; Lichter, Qian, and Crowley 2005).
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Research of  cohabitation in economics, sociology, and family studies 
provide rich descriptive data. Western societies, in general, have shown greater 
acceptance of  individual choices including cohabitation (Ressler and Waters 
1995). This social trend is evident in the fact that half  of  the US population 
has cohabited by the age 30 (Bumpass and Sweet 1989). Bumpass, Sweet, 
and Cherlin (1991) found cohabitation to be a true family status, with most 
cohabitating individuals expecting to marry their partner.  Cohabitation was 
found to be a cause of  the decrease in marriage rates (Axinn and Thornton 
1993); however, Bumpass and Sweet (1989) suggest the relationship direction 
to be from divorce to cohabitation. Cohabitation prior to marriage is 
correlated with higher divorce rates than marriage without prior cohabitation 
(Axinn and Thornton 1993).  Reasons for cohabiting include: less personal 
commitment; less sexual faithfulness; individual independence; and assurance 
of  compatibility before marriage (Bumpass, Sweet, and Cherlin 1991).  
Numerous studies rely on secondary data to develop models of  marriage, 
cohabitation, and divorce. As noted by Brien, Lillard, and Stern (2006), data 
from the National Longitudinal Study of  the High School Class of  1092 
(NLS72) is the basis for numerous studies and have found that: 1) many 
relationships begin as a non-marital cohabitation; 2) cohabitations are shorter 
lived than marriages; 3) many cohabitants are converted into marriage; 4) the 
risk of  separation declines with the duration of  the relationship; and 5) the risk 
of  divorce in marriages preceded by a non-marital cohabitation with the same 
partner is higher than in other marriages. Marriage and cohabitation differ 
in many ways. Cohabitating couples, as compared to married couples, are less 
educated (Bumpress and Sweet 1989), participate less in religion (Thornton, 
Axinn, and Hill 1992), are less likely to support traditional behaviors for men 
and women (Blumstein and Schwartz 1983; Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988), 
and are more likely to keep finances separate (Blumstein and Schwartz 1993; 
Winkler 1997).
In summary, cohabitation as a type of  family has evolved as attitudes in 
Western societies move toward individual choice. Cohabitating arrangements 
are consistent with theories of  marriage as a union of  give and take, seeking 
benefit optimization.
Marriage and the Laws
The concept of  marriage is a matter of  state law.  For the exception of  
a few states (i.e., Georgia, Illinois, and Louisiana), most states recognition 
some rights for non-married, cohabitating couples under common-law rights 
(Gordon 1998-1999).  However, these rights are generally limited to the 
division of  property accumulated during the tenure of  the union and exclude 
rights of  third parties (i.e., rights of  inheritance, rights to be covered under 
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companion’s medical insurance). Cohabiting couples who have written contract 
may be afforded rights under contract laws; however, few cohabiting couples 
executed written contracts (Bowman 2004).
Most statute-based cohabitation laws in the US have been created in 
response to the pressure of  same-sex marriages (Bowman 2004). Vermont 
passed a statute recognizing an alternative status to marriage called civil 
unions. Couples registering as civil unions in the state of  Vermont are afford 
all the benefits and protections of  marriage including, but not limited to, 
property rights, adoption, tax treatment, insurance benefits, and hospital 
visitation. Massachusetts followed Vermont and was the first state to issue 
same-sex marriage licenses. However, these rights may not be valid in other 
states.  For example, if  a couple married in Massachusetts moves to Georgia, 
the rights afforded them in Massachusetts are not transportable to Georgia.
Several states have embraced the notion of  domestic partnership. Hawaii’s 
Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act of  1997 states that couples that are legally 
prohibited from marrying may register as domestic partners and receives 
several rights including the right of  inheritance, worker’s compensation 
survivorship benefits, health-related benefits, family leave, and the right to 
make health care decisions for a partner. After the unilateral decision of  the 
San Francisco mayor to issue same-sex marriage license, the California courts 
were forced to act and passed the Domestic Partner Registration Act in 2001. 
Amending the Domestic Partner Registration Act in 2003 and effective in 
January 2005, the Domestic Rights and Responsibilities Act gives the most 
extensive rights to domestic partners in California behind Massachusetts and 
Vermont. This act gives domestic partners the same rights as married couples 
with the exception of  federal income filing status.
In summary, the notion of  non-marital unions is recognized by most 
states in the US.  However, the rights afforded these non-traditional unions 
varies widely across states with some states specifically denouncing rights for 
anything except legally sanctioned unions between one man and one women to 
states providing all rights afforded heterosexual married to same-sex unions.
Taxation
Before 1948, the US personal federal income tax focused on the individual 
by taxing each person’s “entire net income received” (Revenue Act of  1916, 
ch. 463, 39). The Revenue Act of  1948, and several subsequent modifications, 
changed the focus from each person to marital and family affiliations (Neill 
1983). This act allowed married couples to file a joint return in which their 
consolidated income would be equally split, with taxes paid on each half  
regardless of  the actual earning ratio between the spouses. Creating a situation 
for a wife, contemplating to enter the labor force is faced with tax on her 
earnings that depended on the level of  her husband’s earnings. In 1980, for 
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example, a homemaker with two children would face a marginal tax rate of  
16% on her first dollar earned if  her husband earned $10,000 that year, 22% 
if  he earned $20,000 that year, and 32% if  he earned $30,000 that year. Under 
the system of  individual filing that prevailed before 1948, her marginal tax rate 
was independent of  her husband’s earnings. This tax regulation allowed for a 
marriage bonus or single’s penalty, because by marrying someone with little or 
no income a person could substantially lower his or her tax burden. Conversely, 
the loss of  a spouse could entail a rise in tax liability (Neill 1983). 
In 1951 a third set of  tax rates were introduced for head of  households 
effectively  providing partial income splitting privileges to non-married 
persons with dependents. To qualify for the head of  household filing status a 
person must be unmarried and pay more than half  the cost of  a maintaining a 
home for themselves and another relative who lives with them for over half  the 
year and can be claimed as their dependent. In 1969, Congress enacted a fourth 
set of  rates for single tax payers, ensuring that their rates would generally not 
be higher than 120% of  the joint return schedule. However, married couple 
choosing to file separately could use the new rates for single taxpayers. As 
a result, many two-income couples pay a combined tax that is considerably 
higher than the taxes paid by the two single persons with the same total 
income. Taxes of  these two-income couples would fall if  they divorced, and 
taxes of  the two single persons would rise of  they married. It is this feature of  
the tax regulation that is dubbed the marriage penalty. However, married, two-
income couples were not made worse off  as result of  the 1969 act (Neill 1983).
A husband and wife may file a joint return only if  they are not legally 
separated (i.e., separated under decree of  divorce or separate maintenance 
agreement) on the last day of  the year. Spouses who are separated under 
an interlocutory decree of  divorce are considered husband and wife and are 
entitled to file a joint return until the decree becomes final. The filing of  
a joint return will result in a savings of  tax in those instances in which 
differences in the tax rate brackets for joint and separate returns result 
in higher tax rates for married individuals filing separately. Generally, a 
husband and wife are generally jointly and individually liable for the entire 
tax on a joint return. However, relief  from this general rule is available under 
certain circumstances, commonly referred to as innocent spouse relief.
In summary, the status of  married, and all associated benefits under 
federal income tax law, is reserved for legal unions between heterosexual 
partners.  Therefore, cohabiting couples are not afforded the tax benefits 
awarded to legally married couples under federal tax acts. Conversely, 
cohabiting couples are not liable for each other’s tax obligations as are legally 
married couples.
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MODEL OF CHANGE IN FAMILY STRUCTURE
The decision to marry, cohabitate, divorce, or remain single is complex 
and incorporates incentives (disincentives) that are both monetary and non-
monetary.  Therefore, a model of  the change of  family structure should 
incorporate both dimensions (i.e., monetary and non-monetary). Although the 
focus of  the current study considers the monetary incentives (disincentives) of  
federal taxation, non-monetary incentives (disincentives) must be considered 
when developing a model of  family structure choice.  In the following 
discussion, the authors draw on theories of  family and relevant literature to 
develop a conceptual Model of  Family Structure.
Theories of  family argue that individuals choose a family structure based 
on economic benefit.  Current tax regulations offer economic benefit for 
married filing joint; however, the ability to take advantage of  the tax benefit 
is not available to all individuals in the US (i.e., same-sex marriage are not 
recognized as a marriage under federal law).  There is also a tax incentive for 
unmarried head-of-household (i.e., single parents), which implies an incentive 
to divorce for married couples with a qualified dependent. 
The only family structure not recognized under federal law is non-
marital cohabitation. There is no federal tax incentive for individuals to 
engage in non-marital cohabitation. However, research shows that the rate of  
non-marital cohabitation is skyrocketing. Furthermore, research suggests a 
causal relationship between non-marital cohabitation and divorce (Axinn and 
Thornton 1993). This phenomenon supports the complexity of  marriage and 
numerous factors that individuals consider when making a family structure 
decision.
Drawing on existing literature, in addition to economic incentives 
(disincentives), factors that influence family structure include individual 
traits (e.g., age, sexual orientation), attitudes (e.g., culture, religion, family 
and commitment), socioeconomic status (i.e., cohabitation is more likely in 
lower socioeconomic couples), and legal constraints (i.e., civil unions, domestic 
partners, common-law marriage, same-sex marriages) (Figure 1).
It is proposed that all individuals begin as single persons.  Personal traits 
such as age and sexual orientation, as well as learned values and attitudes 
(i.e., culture) influence whether or not the individual will move from his or 
her single status to another family structure. Legal constraints mediate the 
movement from a person’s original single status. Two variables moderate the 
choice to move from single to another family structure: socioeconomic status 
and economic incentives. Theories of  marriage suggest that specialization 
leads to a greater benefit for join living arrangements (couple) compared to 
the sum of  the individuals. Furthermore, it is proposed that tax incentives 
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(disincentives) moderate individuals’ decision to change their family 
structure. 
Although the variables that impact change of  family structure are 
identified in the proposed model, the intensity of  these variables is unknown. 
For example, the amount of  the tax rate incentive may not be great enough 
to instigate a change in family structure. Research shows that singles remain 
longer in the parental home than in previous decades. It is logical to suggest 
that the intensity of  the incentives to change one’s status is too low to motivate 
one to change his or her family structure.  
Figure 1:  Model of  Family Structure Change
 
PROPOSITIONS
The fundamental notion of  family forms the basis for US taxation. It 
is proposed that the concept of  family and other non-marital concepts of  
human union are all grounded in the notion of  economic benefit. Individual 
form relationships, because doing so puts them in a better position than 
without the relationship. This notion is supported by various theories of  
marriage (e.g., Becker 1965, 1973) and is conceptually generalizable to non-
marital unions such as same-sex union, heterosexual singles, and single 
Socioeconomic 
Status
(Income, occupation)Attitudes
(Culture and values - 
religion, social norms, 
family)
Change of Family 
Structure
[Single (no change), 
non-marital cohabitation, 
marriage]
Legal Constraints
(Civil unions, domestic 
partners, common-law 
marriage, same-sex 
marriages)
Single
(Original status)
Economic 
Incentive
(Specialization; 
tax benefit/cost)
Traits
(Age, sexual 
orientation)
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parents. If  or when the economic benefit of  a human union changes, the 
relationship will also change. If  economic gain is positive, the cohabitation 
moves to marriage or the relationship is registered. If  economic gain is 
negative, the result is separation or divorce.  
Tax regulations represent an economic benefit.  Prior to 1948, tax rates 
offered no benefit for married couples; all income was based on individual 
income. After 1948, the marriage bonus or single penalty was passed. The 
1948 act provided an economic incentive to marry.  
P1:  Holding other variables constant, the percentage of  
federal, individual tax returns for married filing joint filings 
increases after 1948.
P2:  Holding other variables constant, the percentage of  
federal, individual tax returns for single filings decreases 
after 1948.
In 1951, the designation of  unmarried head-of-household was enacted 
providing a tax incentive (i.e., low tax rate) for unmarried parents. Hence, the 
following is proposed.
P3:  The percentage of  federal, individual tax returns for  
unmarried head-of-household filing increases after 1951.
 
P3:  Holding other variables constant, the percentage of  
federal, individual tax returns for single filings increases 
after 1952. 
In considering the proposed relationships, other factors that influence the 
choice of  family structure must be considered. First, the natural increase in 
the US population and the age composition of  the population are essential. 
The US population increased at a decreasing rate between 1950 and 1990 
(U. S. Census Bureau 2001c); the 50- to 54-year age group experienced the 
largest percentage growth between 1990 and 2000 (U. S. Census Bureau 
2001a); and the number of  non-family households (i.e., two or more non-
relative person in a household) represented 6.1% of  all household types (U. S. 
Census Bureau 2001b). 
In considering the behavior of  individuals concerning family structure, 
it is also important to consider differences among geographic areas. For 
example, in 2000, 31% of  all households in the US resided in four states (i.e., 
California, Texas, New York, and Florida) (U. S. Census Bureau 2001b). The 
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effect size for those States might be different from the aggregate population. 
Similarly, the youngest population resides in the West where the median age 
is 33.8 years (U. S. Census Bureau 2001a).
DISCUSSION AND DIRECTION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Understanding what motivates individuals to enter into or change their 
family status is pervasive in the study of  human behaviors.  The current 
study is a preliminary attempt to identify variable that influence human 
behavior in the creation of  family structures. The benefits/costs associated 
with federal taxes offer an economic incentive (disincentive) to change one’s 
family structure. Empirically testing is necessary to assess the intensity of  
tax incentives (disincentives) to motivate a change.  
The Future of  Family and Taxation
The notion of  family is dynamic. The notion of  family has evolved 
over time as social movements (i.e., change in social values and norm; trend 
toward individual choice) reshape US society. What defines a family is as 
complex as the various living arrangements now embraced by individuals. 
Even the most basic function of  what once defined a family, child bearing 
and rearing, has been relegated to a variety of  human union.  Surrogate 
mothers take child bearing outside the family; genetically developed embryos 
can create three-parented children (Mangu-Ward 2008). It is likely that the 
notion of  family will continue to change in the US, as social norms change 
and evolve.
It is not likely that the federal government will recognize the various 
family structures now present in the US. For example, tax regulations do 
not recognize same-sex marriages that are now sanctioned by two states; 
same-sex marriages do not qualify as married filing joint for federal tax 
purposes. The non-recognition by the federal government is not likely 
to change for several reasons. For example, the federal government has 
relegated the interpretation of  what constitutes a marriage to individual 
states. The division between federal government and the states is a doctrine 
long recognized and honored in the US. Furthermore, there is no bridge 
among and between states to provide a uniform meaning, so “marriage” is not 
transportable between states.  Furthermore, the sheer size of  the bureaucracy 
of  government makes it difficult to quickly react to changes in the 
environment. Some progress is evident; in the U. S. Census 2000, the federal 
government defined and distinguished “household,” “family household,” and 
“nonfamily household.” However, it is not likely that tax reform will afford 
21
Family Structure Choice
non-traditional human unions (e.g., same-sex marriages) the same benefits 
reserved for legally sanctioned heterosexual marriages.
Direction for Future Research
Future research is necessary to fully understand the process of  family 
structure choice and the factors that influence those choices. First, empirical 
research to test the propositions set forth in this paper is prescribed. The 
model provided in this paper is an overall, broad conceptualization of  
family structure. Future research should investigation differences between 
various family structures. Each type of  “human union” presents a unique 
set of  conceptual and operational challenges. Future research should seek 
to delineate between the various arrangements. For example, tax rates may 
be a moderator for the choice to move from single and married, but not a 
significant element of  movement from single to non-marital cohabitation. 
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